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U.S.-Based Fast-Food Restaurants:
Factors Influencing the International Expansion of Franchise Systems

Abstract

Studies of international franchising are scant, but increasing, and can be divided into
two

streams

of

research:

those

focusing

on

environmental

predictors

of

internationalization and those focusing on strategic, firm-level characteristics.
Examining the latter category, this study empirically explores a set of firm-level
attributes as predictors of decision-making on whether or not firms seek international
expansion. Using longitudinal data from Bond’s Franchise Guide 2001-2008, we draw
on a sample of U.S.-based fast-food franchise systems to test our hypotheses.
Specifically, our database is comprised of 1,058 observations of 158 chains and we
estimate a semi-parametric logistic model for international franchising.

The model

contributes to the literature by being the first to examine the nonlinearity of international
franchising determinants using agency theory. The results show that (1) bonding, (2)
the percentage of franchised units, (3) the number of states within which the system
operates, and (4) the provision of area development agreements and sub-franchising
significantly contribute to the international expansion of U.S.-based fast-food
franchisors.
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U.S.-Based Fast-Food Restaurants:
Factors Influencing the International Expansion of Franchise Systems

Introduction

Decision by franchisors to go global have attracted increasing interest to both
practitioners and academics since the takeoff in the 1990s of international franchising
(Alon, 1999), in part as a perceived saturation of the domestic marketplace. Fast-food
U.S. franchisors like McDonald’s, Subway, Burger King, and others have led the way in
internationalization and as a result their systems have grown dramatically. For example,
almost 6 percent of the sales revenue of McDonald’s is generated from its overseas
operations. Most major franchisors today are seeking international franchisees (Alon,
2010). Dant, Perrigot, and Cliquet (2008) report that 68.74 percent of U.S. franchise
chains operate internationally.
Two theoretical streams have dominated explanations of franchising (both
domestically and internationally): agency theory and resource-based theory (Alon,
2006a). Agency theory is one of the primary explanations in the literature. “An agency
relationship is present whenever one party (the principal) depends on another party (the
agent) to undertake some action on the principal’s behalf (Bergen, Dutta, & Walker,
1992, p. 1). In the case of franchising, the franchisor is the principal and the franchisee
is the agent. Agency theorists assume that organizations want to minimize the costs of
organizational governance, “the costs of aligning the incentives of principals and agents,
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including bonding and monitoring” (Norton, 1988, p. 202) and they propose that
franchise contracts achieve these goals.
Agency theory presents the counterpoint to the resource constraints theoretic
perspective on franchising, especially the related dark prediction of ownership
redirection proposed by Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1969) who suggest that since franchise
relationships are crafted by franchisors to quickly garner scarce resources from
franchisees, once the systems mature and become resource flush, they will no longer
need their franchisee partners (see Baker & Dant [2008] for a detailed historical account
of this premise).

Agency theory suggests that franchising will thrive over time (as

agency costs rise), whereas resource scarcity predicts the opposite -- that franchising
will disappear as the resources of the company develop.
Despite the contradictory predictions of the agency and resource-scarcity
theories regarding franchising, there is a tendency in the literature to combine agency
theory with other theories, primarily resource scarcity, to come up with holistic
explanations of franchising (e.g., Combs, Michael, & Castrogiovanni, 2004; Tracey &
Jarvis, 2007). Castrogiovanni, Combs, and Justis (2006b), for example, show that
resource-scarcity considerations are more important when a firm is young, but agency
explanations tend to dominate later in the lifecycle of the franchise as it matures to
create a cubic relation between age and the proportion of franchises. Castrogiovanni et
al. (2006a) recommend a move from resource-scarcity to resource-based approaches
to understand franchising because resources should be defined more broadly to
encapsulate the full range of services that are required for expansion by a franchisor.
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In the international franchising literature, authors also combine resource-based
and agency theoretic perspectives to develop explanations of franchising globalization.
Based on Huszagh et al. (1992) and Shane (1996a), Alon (1999), for example, shows
that franchising internationalization is based on resource-based factors, such as size,
age, and growth rate, as well as agency factors, such as royalties, fees, and dispersion.
Previous studies, however, are limited because they only examine linear or log-linear
trends with fixed coefficients, focusing only on the sign of the coefficient and its
statistical significance.
However, by nature the dynamic reality of international franchising is not
necessarily linear or log-linear. For example, firms often have to reach a critical size
before venturing abroad and they may become less adventurous internationally after
they reach a certain level of experience and scale. Johnson and Alon (2005) show that
franchisors

can

be

divided

into

different

classes

with

varying

degrees

of

internationalization. Similarly, in the domestic context, Combs, Ketchen, and Hoover
(2004) find that placing franchises into strategic groups better explains the relationship
between franchising and performance. Strategic groups influenced by resource scarcity
perform less well. These findings suggest that there are limitations to traditional linear
empirical approaches to modeling franchising.
Given the two theoretic approaches in the literature on franchising, we
hypothesize that the relationship between age and internationalization and investment
and internationalization will follow a u-shape. In the initial stages of franchising
development, franchisors focus on building their system and they do this mostly through
domestic franchising (Castrogiovanni et al., 2006a). At this stage, resource-scarcity
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considerations dominate. Over time, however, as the franchisor matures agency factors
become more relevant (Castrogiovanni et al., 2006a). In an international context,
agency costs are especially high since monitoring is more difficult across space, culture,
and institutional environment. We thus predict that when a franchisor reaches a certain
age, it will be more likely to internationalize by seeking international franchisees in
foreign markets.
Given the limited nature of the previous empirical studies on international
franchising, this study singularly contributes to the literature by examining the dynamic
nature of international franchising using semi-parametric modeling for the logistic
regression. This technique allows us to examine the non-linearity of the data over time.
Research by Combs, Ketchen, & Hoover (2004) and Castrogiovanni et al. (2006b) finds
non-linear trends in the predictor variables of franchising performance and ownership.
Their nonlinear models provide an opportunity to partially resolve the theoretical
contradictions between resource-scarcity and agency theory.
Here, the contribution of a predictor factor or a pair of factors can assume any
continuous function. Essentially, we partition the explanatory variables into the
parametric group and the nonparametric group, where the contributions from the first
group (including the dummy variables) are linear, and those from the second group are
estimated via penalized splines (Ruppert, Wand, & Carroll, 2003). Using this analytical
strategy, using a variety of predictors that were previously established in the literature,
we are better able to show how franchisors reach the decision to internationalize. We
employ a longitudinal dataset spanning eight years (2001 to 2008), comprised of 1,058
observations and across 158 U.S.-based fast-food franchise chains to test our model.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We begin by developing a
theoretical framework, mainly based on agency theory, to identify a series of firmspecific strategic factors; we subsequently estimate their contributions to the decision to
expand internationally. Agency theory has been frequently used to explain the
emergence of franchising. Some of the explanations for the internationalization of
franchising systems using agency theory were originally developed by Shane (1996a)
and extended by others (e.g., Alon, 2006a). The paper concludes with a series of
implications for future researchers and franchisors.

Agency Theoretic Explanations of International Franchising

A meta-analysis of the franchising literature by Combs and Ketchen (2003)
reveals that hypotheses grounded in agency theory perform better than hypotheses
grounded in resource scarcity. In franchising, agency theory is also used to model
financial returns (Obi, 2005; Brewer, 2003), the proportion of franchising (Alon, 2001;
Seshadri, 2002; Pfister et al., 2006; Castrogiovanni et al., 2006B) contractual restraints
(Brickley, 1999), franchise compensation (Vázquez, 2005), power and control (Quinn &
Doherty, 2000; Pizanti & Lerner, 2003; Dahlstrom et al., 2009), performance (Chaudey
& Fadairo, 2008), multi-unit franchising strategies and internationalization (Sashi &
Karuppur, 2002).
Agency theory portrays franchising as an organizational form that minimizes the
organizational agency costs, especially the monitoring costs. This is because the
manner in which earnings are shared between the franchisors and their franchisees
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motivates the franchisees to be efficient.

Franchisees are “owner-managers that

typically bear the residual risks of a local operation because their wealth is largely
determined by the difference between the stochastic revenue inflows to the local
operation and promised payments to other factors of production” (Norton, 1988, p.201).
Since the franchisee has a residual claim and ownership in the franchised unit, shirking
is minimized.
Shane (1996b) proposes that franchising is a mechanism of minimizing agency
problems of growth. He finds support for the hypotheses that (1) franchising provides
faster growth, and (2) franchising increases a firm’s likelihood of survival. Because of
the implied monitoring costs associated with overseeing company managers, the
increase in potential income that may accrue with direct (or company) ownership of
franchise outlets may be insufficient to offset the greater efficiency of the franchisee
(Bergen, Dutta, & Walker, 1992).
Studies of domestic franchising empirically confirms the presence of agency
costs and the importance of monitoring skills in the development of franchising. Norton
(1988) hypothesizes that as monitoring costs increase, the incidence of franchising
contracts increases as well.

The two variables Norton (1988) uses as proxies for

monitoring costs, population dispersion and labor intensity, are found to be positively
associated with the percentage of establishments categorized as franchise holders.
Norton (1988) finds support for the principal-agent explanation of franchise contracts.
Brickley and Dark (1987) find support for the hypotheses that the proportion of
franchising units increase with the employee monitoring costs and that industries
characterized by non-repeat customers are less likely to franchise. The second
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hypothesis reveals the downside of franchising -- the inefficient risk-bearing and free
riding of some franchisees. Brickley, Dark, and Weisbach (1991) come up with similar
results.
The conclusion of these studies on domestic franchising suggests that the focus
of agency theory is to minimize agency costs.

Based on these premises, Shane

(1996a) developed a model to explain the internationalization of U.S. franchising
systems as a function of bonding and learned monitoring capabilities. Shane (1996a)
claims that franchisee opportunism can be reduced through ex-ante bonding
mechanisms, or a pricing structure that requires high initial investment relative to
royalties. He thus extends traditional agency explanations of franchising to the
international environment and paves the way for the future development of international
research on franchising. Extensions of Shane’s model (1996a) have been developed by
a number of scholars, including Alon (2006a), Castrogiovanni et al. (2006a), Garg and
Rasheed (2003, 2006), and Welsh et al. (2006).
Given the focus of agency theory on agency costs and monitoring skills, a
number of salient factors have emerged in the literature as potential explanatory
variables for modeling international franchising.

Our agency theoretic model of

international franchising consists of a total of seven predictor variables: two variables
associated with bonding and capital resources (FRratio and logAveTinv), two variables
associated with franchising experience (Fexp and Franper), and three variables
associated with geographical locations (logUscale, Disper, and Satur) which, in
conjunction with the franchising experience variables, can be considered to be
surrogates for the monitoring skills.

We explain each of these below and propose
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relevant hypotheses. Given the dynamic nature of a decision to go global, unlike
previous studies this research estimates semi-parametric spline coefficients that allow
for variation in the predictors.

Bonding and Capital Resources

The franchising firm controls the ratio between the initial payment (fee) and the
ongoing payments (royalties). In this fashion it controls the level of bonding. It has been
hypothesized that the higher the level of bonding, the less the probability that a
franchisee will act opportunistically (Shane, 1996a; Alon, 1999). This is because (1) the
franchisee fee often accounts for more than one-half of the total investment of the
franchisee, (2) the franchisee invests a major portion of his/her wealth in the business,
(3) the standard franchising agreement allows franchisors to revoke the contract without
returning the franchise fee if the franchisee does not strictly follow the operational
guidelines of the franchise, and (4) as the cost of termination increases, the higher the
initial fee is relative to the ongoing fees. “As the threat of opportunism is greater in
international franchising than domestic franchising, one would expect to find higher
franchise fees relative to royalty and advertising rates among companies that intend to
expand overseas” (Shane, 1996a, p. 77). Shane measures the ex-ante bond as a ratio
between the initial fee and the ongoing fees and finds support for the hypothesis that
ex-ante bonding increases the likelihood of internationalization of the franchise system.
International franchising operations require that the franchisor manage the
business in remote locations. Because remote locations have higher monitoring costs
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(Combs & Castrogiovanni, 1994; Brickley & Dark, 1987; Norton, 1988), franchisors can
price their business system such that the franchisee bears the greater risks. This is
done by increasing the initial investment relative to the ongoing payments, or
decreasing the royalties relative to the franchise fee. In this situation the franchisor is in
the position to receive the franchise fee regardless of whether the franchisee business
entity succeeds or fails. The advantage of using this price bonding variable is that the
ratio is controlled by the franchisor.
Combs and Castrogiovanni (1994, p. 42) define royalties as the “proportion of the
present value of intangible resources that cannot be incorporated into the up-front fee
due to the unpredictability of unit sales.” Because international sales of U.S. franchising
systems are likely to be more unpredictable overseas than domestically, international
franchisors would prefer to receive more of the money up-front rather than over time in
the form of royalties.

A survey by Arthur Andersen (1996) shows that the initial

franchise fees of international units tend to be the same or higher than those of
domestic units, whereas the ongoing payments tend to be the same or lower. This
finding is consistent with Shane’s finding (1996a) regarding the effect of price bonding.
Similarly, the total franchise investment needed by a franchisee to initiate a
venture works as a bonding agent for the franchisor. In a sense, the total franchise
investment is the “capital at risk” that the franchisee must put up.

This franchise

investment, which includes the start-up costs associated with getting the business up
and running, is in jeopardy if the franchisee does not follow the rules of the franchisor,
or fails to reach the performance criteria. Alon (1999) finds the start-up costs to be
positively associated with the internationalization of professional business franchises.
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Combs and Castrogiovanni (1994, p. 41) have noted that “high start-up costs suggest
that the franchisee is the primary party risking loss of appropriable quasi-rents. These
quasi-rents may actually provide an additional incentive for the franchisee to act in
accordance with franchisor wishes in order to avoid quasi-rent appropriation.” Since
start-up costs increase the effects of bonding between the franchisee and the
franchisor, the more likely the franchisor is to internationalize, the higher the start-up
costs. The significance of the start-up costs is consistent with Huszagh, Huszagh and
McIntyre’s prediction (1992) that the equity capital requirements of the franchisor will
emerge as a significant factor distinguishing between domestic and international
franchisors.
The above explanation yields our first two hypotheses:
H1: The higher the level of the franchise fee to the royalties bonding ratio,
the more likely that the franchisor will seek international franchisees.

H2: The higher the level of franchise investment that is required, the more
likely will that the franchisor will seek international franchisees.

Franchise Experience
Those franchisors that already have substantial franchising experience, either
through direct operations of a large percentage of franchise outlets or through years of
operations, are more likely to possess the type of monitoring skills that are needed for
internationalization. Franchising operations require skills in monitoring remote locations
that have different resource endowments and varying demands.
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As franchising

experience increases, firms are likely to develop organizational capabilities, managerial
talent, local knowledge, long-distance management skills, cultural adaptability skills, and
host country management skills (Combs & Castrogiovanni, 1994; Fladmoe-Lindquist,
1996; Norton, 1988; Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969). Huszagh, Huszagh and McIntyre (1992)
propose that international franchisors have greater cumulative experience, scale
economies, product differentiation, capital requirements, and headquarters benefits,
thus allowing them to erect entry barriers against new firms and to compete successfully
overseas as compared to domestic franchisers.

As franchising firms gather more

experience, they develop the routines and capabilities to monitor franchisees while
reducing agency costs. Alon (1999) hypothesizes that the more franchised units that a
firm has, the more efficient are its monitoring and performance-measuring capabilities.
This is because the sheer volume of monitoring a large number of franchised units over
time will generate organizational capabilities for more educated routines to identify
shirking (Huszagh, Huszagh, & McIntyre, 1992).

Enhanced monitoring capabilities

reduce the incidence of opportunistic behavior by the franchisees, thereby allowing
international expansion through franchising (Shane, 1996a; Fladmoe-Lindquist, 1996).
The more experienced franchisors are likely to have improved know-how about
activities such as site selection, store layout, procurement, and operations that likely
yield cost-reduction advantages relative to the less-experienced franchisors (Huszagh,
Huszagh, & McIntyre, 1992). Such experience and know-how allow an older franchising
firm to more successfully transfer its operating system to a foreign market than a young
franchisor. Past research (Huszagh, Huszagh, & McIntyre, 1992; Alon, 1999, 2006a)
support the premise that older franchisors are more inclined to have international

13

franchisees. When purely domestic franchisors were asked why their firms did not have
franchises outside of the United States, the number one reason was that the company
was too young (Arthur Andersen, 1996). Eroglu (1992) proposes that the older and
more experienced a franchisor, the lower the amount of perceived risk associated with
internationalization, and thus the more likely the franchisor will seek international
franchisees.

Huszagh, Huszagh, and McIntyre (1992) show that the age of the

franchising system is positively related to its decision to internationalize.

“These

findings imply that experience is still a powerful tool for dealing with the physical and
cultural distance inherent in franchising overseas.

The inability of technology to

substitute for experience appears to be borne out by these results” (Huszagh, Huszagh,
& McIntyre, 1992, p.14). Based on this literature, our next two hypotheses are:
H3: The greater the franchising experience of the franchisor, the more
likely that the franchisor will seek international franchisees.

H4: The greater the percentage of franchised outlets in the company’s
system, the more likely that the franchisor will seek international
franchisees.

Geographical Locations
At least three geographical considerations can be justified by agency theory and
the previous literature on international franchising: (1) the scale of U.S. operations, (2)
the extent of physical dispersion of the outlets, and (3) the saturation of the domestic
market.
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As firms grow in size by developing additional franchised outlets, they develop
better skills and more experience in managing and monitoring franchisees, and in
developing better routines to work with them.

Economies of scale in purchasing,

promotion, R&D, monitoring, and quality programs can result in cost reductions and can
increase interdependencies between the franchisor and the franchisees. Experiences
in sharing best practices among franchisees and managing across heterogeneous
locations are likely to engender a desire on the part of growth-minded franchisors to
venture abroad for new franchisees.

The sheer volume of business experience in the

larger systems has the potential of generating more educated routines to identify
shirking (Huszagh, Huszagh, & McIntyre, 1992) and to develop more efficient systems
to monitor effectively, thereby paving the way for growth through international expansion
(Shane, 1996a; Fladmoe-Lindquist, 1996).

Monitoring capabilities are likely to be

especially critical to the success of an international franchisor (Fladmoe-Lindquist,
1996). Shane (1996a) finds support for the hypothesis that better monitoring skills
increase the propensity of franchisors to internationalize.1
According

to

agency

theory,

franchisors

with

dispersed

units

require

greatermonitoring capabilities (Fladmoe-Lindquist, 1996). Franchisors with many
franchisees in heterogeneous locations across the United States are better poised to
take advantage of economies of scale for promotion and monitoring because such
locations incorporate differing levels of return and risk (Huszagh, Huszagh, & McIntyre
1

Shane measures monitoring skills as a multiplicative composite index consisting of the
number of franchised units, the percentage of franchised outlets, and the age of the franchise
system. However, he does not propose any theoretical reasons for such a multiplicative
measure. Further, since these variables are likely to be correlated, they potentially could
obfuscate the regression coefficient results. For this reason, in this study we utilize the measure
of geographical dispersion as a proxy for monitoring capabilities.
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1992). Therefore, franchisors that are national in scope are more likely to
internationalize because they have enhanced levels of monitoring capabilities in its
domestic operations. For such systems, the foreign subsidiary becomes merely an
extension to the domestic operations. This is especially true for franchisors that first
seek international expansion in Canada or in other English-speaking countries.

All

things being equal, the more dispersed that the domestic franchising operations are, the
greater the monitoring capabilities, and the more likely the franchisor will seek
international franchisees.
There is also a greater probability that larger franchising firms have saturated the
domestic market and are looking to grow through international expansion (Shane,
1996a). The more outlets the franchise system has in its domestic operations, the more
likely it is to saturate the market and to look to expand overseas. Fast-food companies
like McDonald’s, Subway, or Burger King may have saturated much of their market in
the United States. Early research also indicates that larger domestic franchisors have a
higher preponderance of units outside the United States (Hackett 1976; Walker & Etzel,
1973). Aydin and Kacker (1990) show that smaller franchising systems are less likely
than larger systems to seek international franchisees. Huszagh, Huszagh, and McIntyre
(1992) also find a significant positive association between the number of units and the
decision to internationalize. However, they expect that, in the future, technology, in
particular

telecommunications,

will

mitigate

the

influence

of

scale

on

the

internationalization of franchising systems. A survey by Arthur Andersen (1996) reveals
that franchisors with over 86 units are more likely to belong to the International
Franchise Association and to have franchises operating outside the United States.
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The above discussion yields our final three hypotheses associated with the
geographical location of franchised units:
H5: The greater the number of U.S. domestic outlets, the more likely the
franchisor will seek international franchisees.

H6: The greater the dispersion of domestic outlets across the United
States, the more likely the franchisor will seek international franchisees.

H7: The greater the level of saturation of the domestic market, the more
likely that the franchisor will seek international franchisees.

Methodology
Data

Data for the empirical analyses were obtained from the 2001-2008 successive
annual editions of the Bond’s Franchise Guide, a commonly used data source for
franchising research (Dant, Kacker, Coughlan, & Emerson, 2007). The original dataset
contained a total of 1,124 observations from 179 U.S.-based fast-food restaurant
chains.

However, not all of the chains responded to each of the eight years of the

survey. To improve the quality of the analysis, we made a judgment call to retain only
chains with at least 3 observations. Consequently, our analyses are based on 1,058
observations drawn from 158 chains.
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The dependant variable “Y” is a dummy-coded (Yes/No) variable which asked
the franchisor respondents whether or not they seek overseas expansion beyond North
America.

The predictor variables include two variables associated with bonding and

capital resources (FRratio and logAveTinv), two variables associated with franchising
experience (Fexp and Franper), and three variables associated with geographical
location (logUscale, Disper, and Satur).

The latter three, in conjunction with the

franchising experience variables, can be considered to be surrogates for monitoring
skills. Since there were huge variations among the franchisors in terms of the number
of U.S. outlets and the average total investment, we log-transformed these measures
(i.e., logUscale and logAveTinv) to alleviate any excessive influence of certain data
points. Table 1 presents the full operational definitions of our measures. In addition to
the seven predictors, we include three dummy variables (Area, Subf, and Addunit)
associated with multi-unit franchising (i.e., the provision of area development
agreements, sub-franchising, and adding new units) and age to capture the year in
which the information was collected.

Figure 1 shows the plots of the individual

predictors against Y, with the lowess smoothing curves superimposed for visual
enhancement.
Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 about Here
Statistical Technique

In the international franchising literature where the response variable is
frequently dichotomously measured, a logistic regression is the most commonly used
analytic technique to assess the impact of its predictors (e.g., Shane, 1996a; Elango,
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2007). The logistic model is a powerful tool in applied research with the basic model
being log[ p /(1 − p )] = β 0 + ∑ β i xi , where p

= Pr( Y = 1)

is the probability of seeking

i

overseas expansion, and xi ’s are the predictor variables. The coefficients are usually
estimated by maximizing the likelihood function and the goodness-of-the-fit is calculated
by investigating the residuals (McCullagh & Nelder, 1989). A logistic model has been
quite successful for many natural and social phenomena and is regarded as an
excellent first-step approximation. However, it restricts the contribution of each factor to
a linear term with a fixed coefficient. Consequently, most theoretical hypotheses tested
are concerned with the significance of the coefficient (i.e., whether a particular factor is
relevant), and/or the coefficient's sign (i.e., whether the factor under investigation
increases or reduces the probability of the event of interest).
The actual dynamics of decision-making, however, can be much more complex.
The contribution of some predictors may be nonlinear and thus the impact of these
predictors will vary with their different values. Moreover, since the contribution may not
be monotone, statements like “the larger the value of the predictor variable, the higher
the probability the franchisor seeks overseas expansion” are misleading. Sometimes
two or more predictor variables interact with one another to determine the response.
The traditional approach to modeling such contingencies in parametric regression is the
addition of two-way or higher-order product terms into the model.

However, this

strategy may still be too restrictive. To overcome the limitations of an ordinary logistic
regression, we propose a semi-parametric model for the logistic regression:
log[ p /(1 − p )] = α 0 + ∑ α i xi + ∑ f j ( x j ) + ∑ f kl ( xk , xl ),
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(1)

where the contributions of certain xi ’s are linear, including those of the dummy
variables, and those of the other xj 's or pairs of ( xk , xl ) 's are continuous functions
estimated by univariate or bivariate nonparametric smoothing. Essentially, we partition
the predictor variables into a parametric group and a nonparametric group. Hence, the
label “semi-parametric” is derived from the fact that a combination of both parametric
and nonparametric components is used in the same model.
A natural approach to estimate these unknown f j (⋅) 's is to use basis functions like
piecewise polynomials and splines (Wahba,1990). For example, Bessaoud et al. (2005)
incorporate B-splines into the logistic regression in medical studies. In this study, we
propose using penalized spline smoothing. Here, each f j (⋅) is expressed as cubic thin
plate splines
K

f j(x) = β

j0

+ β

j1 x +

∑

µ

jk

| x −κ

jk

(2)

|3 ,

k =1

where, κ jk ’s are knots for xj ((Ruppert, Wand, & Carroll, 2003, Ch. 3.10). The bivariate
function f kl ( xk , xl ) is estimated using a radial basis approximation (see Wand et al., 2005
for details). Cubic splines are claimed to be the lowest-order spline for which the knotdiscontinuity is not visible to the human eye (Hastie et al., 2001). Usually there is no
need to choose an order higher than cubic unless the derivatives are of interest.
Let µ j = ( µ j1 ,..., µ jK )T and let Κj be the K × K matrix with the

kk ' th

element being

| κ jk − κ jk ' |3 . Subsequently, the model fitting is performed by maximizing the penalized

log-likelihood

∑[y

m

log( pˆ m ) + (1 − y m ) log( 1 − pˆ m )] −
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∑λ µ

T

3

j

Κ jµ j

,

where the first term is the usual log-likelihood function for a logistic regression, the
second term is the penalty for the coefficients of the radial functions as in (2). The
smoothing parameter

λ

is chosen via a restricted maximum likelihood. Procedures for

the selection of knots have been suggested in the literature (Ruppert, 2002; Miyata &
Shen, 2003). There is no material difference between the results with varying knots in
this study as long as the number of knots is reasonably large to capture the features of
the data. Since the data are longitudinal, the ideal would be to fit a mixed effect model
assigning a random effect to each fast-food chain. Unfortunately, numerical problems
prevent us from doing this. Therefore, we adopt a cross-sectional approach. The data
analyses are carried out using the default setting of R-package SemiPar 1.0 (Wand et
al., 2005).

Results

Based on model (1), the additive impact of a predictor on the response can be
quite different from the relationship between an individual predictor and the response,
as shown in Figure 1, which often is one of the sources for the conflicting conclusions in
the literature. For example, Figure 1 clearly shows that logAveTinv, Satur, and
logUscale are positively related to the response variable. But if we run a simple logistic
regression including all of the variables, their coefficients are negative, with p-values of
0.0016, 0.0132, and 0.1623 respectively. Nonetheless, a diagnostic like Figure 1 is
often helpful to provide suggestions as to for which predictors we should use linear
terms and for which predictors we should employ nonparametric smoothing.
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Few studies are available to definitively guide us in terms of variable and model
selection for the generalized additive model. In our study, the test for the parametric
group can proceed with the usual Z-tests as in the traditional models. The test for the
nonparametric group can be done by using a χ2 test based on the difference of the
deviance and the estimated degrees of freedom. Table 2 summarizes our final model,
excluding Fexp and Addunit which are not significant at the 5% level. However, we
emphasize that this exclusion does not mean that these two variables individually are
not important. Rather, their additional contributions on top of those from the others
already in the model are not significant.
For the lay reader and the practitioner, the most effective way to understand
these results perhaps is to examine the contribution plot with a 95 percent pointwise
confidence band as in Figure 2. Figure 2 shows the contributions of logAveTinv and
logUscale respectively, whereas Figure 3 shows the joint contribution of Disper and
Satur, which may help explain the unexpected trends observed in the literature.
Insert Table 2, Figure 2, and Figure 3 about here

Conclusions and Discussion
It has been suggested that to mitigate opportunism, a franchisor may create
stronger financial incentives by collecting higher-than-usual initial fees, thus creating a
higher level of bonding between the franchisor and the franchisee. Opportunistic
behavior by the franchisees can also be controlled through effective monitoring. Shane
(1996a) finds support that monitoring, measured as a multiplicative composite index
consisting of the number of franchised units, the percentage of franchised outlets, and
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the age of the franchise system, is positively related to the internationalization of
franchising. Elango (2007) captures the monitoring skills through the percentage of
franchised units and the number of years of the franchise. In general, the greater the
geographic dispersion of the franchised units in the system, the greater is the need to
establish monitoring capabilities.

Hence, franchisors with dispersed units are more

likely to seek international franchisees since they are used to operating in distant
locations and accustomed to taking advantage of economies of scale in promotion and
monitoring (Huszagh, Huszagh, & McIntyre, 1992). Furthermore, domestic saturation
provides another powerful incentive for seeking international expansion.

Franchise

systems with a large number of units in heterogeneous locations are likely to perceive
saturation.
In this study, we employ the ratio of the average franchising fee over the average
royalty rate as the empirical measurement of bonding together with the logarithm of the
average total investment. As suggested by past research, we also use the franchising
experience in years, the percentage of franchised outlets, the logarithm of the number
of domestic outlets, and the number of states where the chain has outlets to model the
propensity to internationalize. In addition, we believe that whether the system units are
concentrated in a small number of states or are scattered across the country may be a
relevant indicator of the chain’s monitoring skills and the level of domestic saturation.
We propose the variable Satur=1−m/n to be a measurement of domestic
saturation where m is the largest number of units in any single state and n is the
number of domestic units. The expansion of franchisors into emerging and developing
markets has increased the use of multi-unit franchising, which has been shown to be
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positively related to system growth (Kaufmann & Dant, 1996). Several permutations of
multi-unit franchising exist, i.e., (1) area development agreements that assign the
franchisees a defined territory in which they are expected to develop additional units
according to a predefined schedule, (2) sub-franchising contracts that allow the
franchisee to be both the agent to the franchisor and the principal to the other subfranchisees, and (3) basic multi-unit franchisee contracts, also called master franchisee
contracts, that simply allow franchisees to establish additional units in a given territory.
Three separate dummy variables were created to correspond to whether or not the
franchisor allows a particular multi-unit permutation.
Data for all the variables were obtained from Bond’s Franchise Guide 2001-2008.
These data were collected using identical annual franchisor questionnaires in which
participation was voluntary.

The dependent variable was a dichotomous (yes/no)

question which sought to ascertain whether or not the U.S.-based franchisor seeks
overseas expansion. Logistic regression is the most commonly used methodology in
studies with a dichotomous dependent response variable.
However, logistic regression restricts the contribution of each factor to a linear
term with a fixed coefficient. Consequently, most theoretical hypotheses tested are
concerned with either the significance of the coefficient and/or its sign.

The true

dynamics of decision-making can be much more complex. In this paper, we propose
semi-parametric modeling for the logistic regression, where the contribution of a factor
or a pair of factors can be any continuous function.

Essentially, we partition the

explanatory variables into the parametric group and the nonparametric group, where the
contributions from the first group (including the dummy variables) are linear, and those
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from the second group are estimated via penalized splines (Ruppert, Wand, & Carroll,
2003).
Based on our model, we find that bonding and the percentage of franchising units
contribute positively to the propensity for international expansion. Both the contributions
from the logarithms of the average total investment and the number of U.S. units
manifest themselves in an interesting “U”-shape, which may indicate a threshold in
terms of capital requirements and the franchisor’s monitoring capability. For example,
the initial increase in the capital requirements may dampen the franchisor’s desire for
international expansion since it will make it more difficult to attract new franchisees. But
after passing the threshold, the large capital requirement may signal the franchisor’s
strong position in the market and its concurrent desire to expand. The number of states
in the United States with an operational presence and domestic saturation also
contributed positively, as expected, to the propensity for international expansion, but in
a nonlinear fashion. Consistent with past research, the permitting of area development
agreements and sub-franchising agreements were also associated with a higher
probability to seek international expansion.
In an attempt to explain this internationalization trend, academics have focused
on two streams of research: one focusing on environmental determinants (countryspecific factors) and the second focusing on organizational determinants (firm-level
factors) that foster the internationalization process. The first stream of research focuses
on either country studies (e.g., Alon & Welsh, 2001, 2002) or variables relating to the
country’s environment which are conducive to internationalization (e.g., Alon, 2006b).
Although these macro-oriented studies have been useful in explaining why some
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countries receive more franchising investment, or why a franchisor will select a specific
country of mode of entry, they are less useful in determining why specific firms within a
given industry are more likely than others to internationalize.
The second stream of research, focusing on firm-level strategic variables, is
helpful in distinguishing among franchising firms that internationalize versus those that
remain focused domestically within a given industry. Using agency and resource-based
theory, for example, Alon (1999) shows that the extent of internationalization of
franchising firms can be largely explained by the size of the systems in a variety of
industries (e.g., hotels, retailing, professional business services).
The conclusions in this article are twofold. First, by combining two theories of
franchising, our total understanding of internationalization is improved. Second, many
variables that explain international franchising are non-linear in their effects. Therefore,
it is crucial that future researchers examine not only linear, unidirectional effects, but
also non-linear impacts. In particular, our research shows that the effects of scale and
investment are in fact curve-linear and concave, with higher and lower levels having a
greater impact on the decision to internationalize.
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Table 1
Operational Definitions of Variables
FRratio

the ratio of the franchising fee over the royalty rate ($k/percentage).

logAveTinv

the logarithm of the average total investment (log($K)).

Fexp

the number of years the company has been franchising.

FranPer

the percentage of franchised units among the total number of units.

logUscale

the logarithm of the number of U.S. units.

Disper

the number of U.S. states where the company has a presence.

Satur

1-m/n, where m is the largest number of units in any single state
and n is the number of domestic units.

Area

indicator of whether area development agreements exist.

Subf

indicator of whether sub-franchising is allowed.

Addunit

indicator if additional outlets within the area can be added.

DEPENDENT “Y” whether or not the franchisor seeks overseas expansion.
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Table 2

Summary of the Model Fit

Coeff.

St. dev.

Z-ratio

p-value

Intercept

-3.7440

1.2300

-3.044

0.0024

FRratio

0.2596

0.0495

5.246

0.0000

FranPer

1.4840

0.4703

3.157

0.0016

Area

0.6390

0.2585

2.471

0.0135

Subf

1.3450

0.1908

7.051

0.0000

df
logAveTinv

2.897

logUscale

2.450
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